Versicherung und Genetik - Optionen zur Verhinderung unerwünschter Auswirkungen

Zusammenfassung

Der Artikel analysiert die verschiedenen Optionen, die sich ergeben, will man die unerwünschten Resultate durch molekulargenetische Informationen im Versicherungswesen verhindern oder abmildern. Es wird zwischen Makro-, Meso- und Mikrooptionen unterschieden. Die Optionen werden auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit ihrer Realisierung hin untersucht.

Abstract

The article analyses the different options to prevent or alleviate the undesirable consequences of molecular genetic information in the sphere of insurance. It distinguishes between macro-, meso- and micro-options. The options are examined in respect of their probability to be realised.

Schlüsselwörter

Versicherung - Molekulare Genetik - Gesundheitswesen

Keywords

Insurance - Molecular Genetics - Health Care System

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